Two decades of cross-cultural research on facial expressions has documented universal consensus in judgments of anger, disgusf ear, happiness, sadness, and surprise (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, ] 971; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971) . Findings from newer studies, however, indicate that cultures also differ in their judgments, particularly when rating intensj~. For example, Ekman et aI. (1987) re'portedthat when observers of different cultures rated theintensity of each of the universal expressions, the cultures disagreed on the abso1me jntensiry levels attribut~d to the expressions. In a subsequent study, Matsumoto and Ekman (in press) reported that these differences were not due to the cultural backgrounds of the posers of each of the expressions, nor 10differences in the affect'lexicons of the-cultures tested.
-
The recent findings suggesting cultural differences in the perception of emotion point to the necessity of conceptualizing culture Al'THOR os :-';OTE: Tlus "ludy wa" supponcd by a rcscan:h granl ITom thc NalionallnsritUlc of Mental in terms of stable, meaningful dimensions to account for such differences. Unfortunately, until now all cross-cultural research on the emotions has operationalized culture by country, which restricts the interpretation of cultural differences, when found, to anecdotal or impressionistic statements. In the study of emotion, the use of a small set of meaningful dimensions along which cultures vary may give us important clues to cultural differences.
On the basis of a large-scale value survey, Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 1983 has offered four dimensions of cultural variation that may be applicable to studies of emotion: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Power distance reflects the way in which interpersonal fclationships form and develop when differences in power are perceived. UncertaintJ' avoidance reflect~the degree to whicb people in a culture feel threatened by ambiguous situations and have created beliefs and institutions to avoid them. Individualism is a~ajor dimension of cultural variability postulated by otber theorists as well (Kluckholn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Marsella, DeVas, & Hsu, 1985; Parsons & Shills, 1951; Triandis, 1986) . Individualistic cultures emphasize individual goals and independence, while collectivistic cultures stress collective goals and dependence on groups. Masculinity reflects the -degree to which cultures delineate sex roles, with masculine cuJlures making clearer differentiations between genders.
Hofstede (1980, 1983) asserts that, in.practice,powerdistance and individuaJism are highly couelated negatively. Thus those cultures typically scoring high on one dimension usuaJly score low on the other, and vice versa. But Hofstede (1~~f1}~8~)~00s~~_t9_--k eep these two dimensions separate, at least on a theoretical level, since they refer to two different conceptual constructs. Thu~for the purposes of this article, it seems most appropriate to adopt Hofstede'5recommendations concerning the treatment of these two dimensions, until data and theory suggest otherwise.
One attempt has already been made to account for cultural differences with respect to emotion antecedents and reactions (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, in press), using data originally reported in Scherer. Wal1bou. and Summerfielc-(1986) were coded in terrns'Of Hofstede's dimensions, and these were correlated with the percent of respondents from each culture giving the three most frequent antecedents for the four emotionssurveyed. Several significant correlations were found, each of which showed the potential utility offlofstede 's (1980, 1983) dimensions in the study of emotion antecedents. For example, power distance was negatively correlated with injustice as an antecedent to anger. In high power distance cultures, inequality and injustice are expected and taken for granted, while they are not expected or acceptable in low power distance cultures. Thus a negative correlation would be predicted between power distance and injustice as an antecedent to anger.
Hofstede '5 (1980, 1983) dimensions 'canalso be used to generate specific hypotheses with respect to cultural differences in the perception of facial expressions. For instance, power distance can be expected to be negatively correlated with the perception of negative emotions. Cultures high on power distanceestablish sodal order by emphasizing differences in power betWeen individuals. These cultures, therefore, tend to be hierarcbical~emphasizing status, vertical relationships, and the importance of groups to which one belongs. In these cultures, the communication of negative emotions, particular1yin social situations, may be attenuated, as the expression and perception of these emotions may be viewed as threatening to the existing social order. Cultures low on power distance, however, emphasize individual equality across different sociai roles. In these 'cultuves, thc'COmmunication 'of negative emotions may be more tolerated.
Individualism can be .expected to relate to emotion in several ways. First, it may be hypothesized that individualism is correlated --positivdy with negative emotions.-Cultureshigh-on-individualisrnemphasize individual uniqueness over groups. The communication of negative emotions will not be frowned upon, and may even be encouraged, as the expression and perception of these emotions wiJI be attributed to individual differences.
Individualism may also affect the degree to which individual variation is observed in judgments of emotion. Cultures high on individualism may produce larger variations in their ju~gments of the emotions, as these cultures encourage individual variation. Cultures low on individualism~on tbe other band, may produce a more restricted range of judgments, as individual variation is frowned upon in favor of groups and col1ectivity.
As uncertainty avoidance is associated with anxiety concerning the unknown, we hypotbesize that it may be particularly relevant to judgments of fear. Cultures high on uncertainty avoidance experience higher anxiety and stress, as tbe uncertainty inherent in life is felt as a continuous threat. These cultures tend to form institutions and social netWorksdesigned to deal with fear. Thus they may tend not to recognize this emotion, or attenuate attributions of intensity when expressed or perceived.
Final1y, cultural differences on masculinity may contribute to gender differences with respect to emotion. Gender:differences in both the expression and the perception of emotion can be expected in cultures high on masculinity, as these cultures tend to make dearer delineations betWeenthe genders. These differences may be especially prominent for negative emotions such as anger, as the expression and perception of these may be sanctioned for one sex but not the other.
This study was designed to~xamine .the utility of stable and meaningfuJ dimensions of cultural variability in the study of emotion. Data from previous cross-cultural research~involving both categorical and intensityjudgments of universal facial expressions, were used. Cultures were coded using Hofstede's (1983) dimensions of cultural variation. These dimensions were then correlated ---~iththre~different.types of -data conceming~judgments of faciaL----expressions: (a) the percent of members of each culture correctly identifying the emotional expression, (b) the mean intensity level attributed to each of the expressions, and (.c) the amount of variability associated with the intensity ratings of each .expression. Cultures were selected for inclusion in this study if (a) they were part of a study comparing members of different cultures in their judgments of the same set of facial stimuli, (b) data concerning judgments either of which emotion is expressed or of emotion intensity were available~and «:) data regarding the culture's placement along each of Hofstede's four dimensions of cultural variabiHty were available. These criteria allowed for the inclusion of 15 different cultures from four studies (Dickey & Knower, 1941; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Ekman et aI., 1987; Izard, 1969) reporting data concerning judgments of which emotion is expressed. Also, seven different cultures from a single study (Ekman et at, 1987) reporting data concerning judgments of emotion intensity met the criteria for inclusion (Table 1) .
CODING OF THE DATA
Judgments o/which emotion. For each of the 15 cultures that met the criteria for inclusion, a composite percent score was coded for each of the six emotions. This composite was calculatedby averaging the percent of judges correctly identifying each of the six emotions across aU photographs of the same emotion within each study. When a -culture was included in more than one study, the score used was the composite score across studies.,calculated by .?~~:T'3i£iJlg ID~iQdividual composite_scores for each study = --Judgments of emotion intensity and variabiliiy in rating. Because the intensity data used in this study came from a single study (Ekman et aI., 1987) , the means and standard deviations for the three individual photQgraphs for each of six emotions were used. A composite mean intensity score was computed by averaging the mean intensity ratings fOT-eachof the six emotions across alJ photos of the sa me emotion. In order to obtain-an estimate of the variabilitv Dimens;onsof cultural variability. Each of the cultur.es were coded two different ways using Hofstede's (1983) four dimensions of cultural variabiHty. One way allowed for coding of the actual scaler values for each culture associated with each of the four dimensions~the second allowed for coding of the rank of each culture (1 through 50) associated with the scaler value foreacb of the four dimensions, relative to the other cultures in the original study (Table 1 ).-
Power
Uncertainty Distance Avoidance I.ndividualism MascuJ.lnity 
RESULTS
.-In order to eXaBline the effects of cultureson the perceptionof ern,otion~p'ear~n product-moment correlations and Spearman rank-ordercoefficients were computed between the two indexes of three ,-of the foU~cultural dimensions and each of the emotion vari.ablesTh~~~~lini~dimension was dropped from the analys~since~11~deq~tetest o{the hypotheSesconcerning this dimension would involve the testing of sex differences for each culture, and examining how the degree of sex difference relates to masculinity as a culture-level concept. AIl.significant correlations reported for the remaining three di!Densions.werealso significant using tbe ,rank vaJue for each /ofthedimensio~and with the rank~rder coefficients using the same variables. All significance tests are two-tailed.
POWER DISTANCE
It was bypothesiz~d t~at power distance would be negatively co~elated "(!th the per~ption of ,negativeemotions. The findings indicated~-upPort for judgments of j~tensity~but not for.the correct identification of the negative em~tions: Power distance was not correlated with the percent of observers identifying the negative emotions, but was negatively correlated with the intensity ratings of anger, fear, and sadness. Thus it appears that the culture-level effects of power distance may be restric.tedtojudgments of emotion intensity only"ratber than judgments Qfwhich emotion is portrayed in the face.
. Power distance was~a15onegatively cOiTelatedwjth~thepercent . of -ob~erve~s correctly identifying happiness, and with tbe varia~mty index of fear. These findings were not predicted.
ISUlYIUUALlSM
We predicted that individualism would be positively correlated with the perception of negatjv~emotions. . 
----------------------------
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port fOTthis'hypothesis forjudgments of intensity,as this dimension was positively,correlated with ratings of anger and fear; ratings of sadness approached~but.did not attain, statistical significance (p = .14). ThebyPOthesis was not supported, bowever~for the percent data. In fact,'',individualism was positively conelated with the percent of observers identifying happiness, and negatively with sadneSs. These latter two findings were not predicted.
.
We also predicted that individualism would be positively cotrelated with the variability index of perception..This hypothesis was not supported, as most of the correlations were negative, with one (fear) reaching statistical significance. ' 
UNCERTAINTYAVOIDANCE
Final1y,we hypothesized that uncertainty avoidance would be associated with judgments.offear expressions. This hypothesis was not supported, as only one correlation out of the 18computed using this dimension reached statistical significance.This corre1atio~for variabilityiil intensity judgments of sadness~was not predi~ed.
As 10 out of the 36 correlations computed for power distance and individualism were statistically significan~it is unlikely that these 'correlation~can be attributed to Type I error. The one significant correlation for uncertainty avoidance, however, may be uniT1terpretaple, since the possibility of Type I error in this case cannot be ruled out.
--------.
-DISCUSSION----The~resultS suggesttbe promise of the inclusion of stable and meaningful dimensions of cultural variabilit)\ such as Hofstede's (1980. 1~83) , in the study of emotion. Cultural differences along dimensions of power distance and individualismprovided clear and interpretable correlations with several types of judgments. But. while Wepredicted that uncertainty avoidance would partictilarly affect judgmentS of fear. this hypothesis was not supported.
The correlations betWeenpower distance and individualism with the intensity ratings of anger, fear, and sadness indicate the effects of these culwral dimensions on these emotions. CUltUreshigh in power distance andlo~in individiJalism.stresshierarchy and group cohesion (:coDectivityj, while individuality is minimized. IIi-these cultures. tb~communication of negative-emotions threatens group solidarity and interpersonalsocial structure. On the other-hand, cul~res low in power distance and high in individuaJism may sanctionthe communicationof these emotionsmore,as they relate-.
to individual freedom to expreSs and perCeive negative emotions.
As such~they do not threaten social structUresand-groups to the extent found in high power distance, low individu8IismcultUres.
Ekman _andFriesen (Elonan, 1972; Friesen, 1972) coiIiCdthe term display rules to account for these types of differences in the expression of negative emotion between Japanese and Americans. These rules are culture-level phenomena that are learned through socialization. It appears that a similar culture-level phenomenon may govern the perception of negative emotions a~!?711. These phenomena, not unlike BucK's (1984) "decoding mlei;b are most 1ikelY~'Jeamed through sociaI~ti9n, ininuch the-sa~e w,ays as displa)r rides. UDfortunately,no study has examined the relation:-ship betWeen cultUral or individual differences in express~on and perception. Indirect evi~ence foi this association, however, comesfrom .MatSumoto and Ekman's {in press) study, which repons American-Japanese cultural differences in tbeper-ception-.ofemotion intensity that are consistent with cultural differences in the display rules 'of these two cultures. . angetfear; and sadness~but not for disgust, is problematic to interpret.-Future studies examining withi.n-culture differences among the$c emotions, both in expression and in perception. may elucidate on these differences. It is interesting to note that in Mat"umoto and Ekman's (in press) stud~' of American-Japanese differences in the perception of emotion intensity, strong and consistent cultUral differences were found for all emotions included except disgust. Perhaps disgust providesdiffer-ent findings than the
other three negative emotions because of differences in the interpersonal natures of these emotions. As anger, fear, and sadness are emotions that are often elicited in interpersonal situations (see - Malc; umoto& Kudoh, in press; Scherer,Matsumoto,Wallbott,& Kudoh, 1988) , these emotions may be particularly influenced by cultural dimensions that pertain to social structure. While {jisgust itself can certainly contain elements of an interpersonalnature (e.g., feeling disgusted with someone), the universal expression of disgust typically used is probably perceived as a reaction without interpersonal context (e.g., a disgusting odor, taste). These, however, remain speculations concerning tbe nature of these emotions.
Power distance and individualism also correlated with tbe percent of observers coaectly identifying happiness and sadness. But these dimensions were not correlated with anger, disgust, or fear, as predicted. As the significant correlations that were obtained were not hypothesized, it is best for these findings to be repHcatedbefore hypotheses concerning their basis are posited.
The hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance would be associated with judgments of fear was not supported. This finding could be related to the type of fear dictated by this cu1turaI dimension. Uncertainty avoidance reflects the degree of fear or anxiety to the unknown, such as the futur-eor -death.Cultures bigh in uncertainty avoidance typically have developed elaborate structures or rituals to compensate for the increased anxiety. Fear as expressed in the universal emotions, bowever, is devoid of this type of context. In -fact,the fear expression used in previous cross-cu1turalresearch may actUally imply a different context, one which dictates an element of surprise. Previous findings indicating that fear is~ften mistaken for surp!"isesupport this notion (see Ekman,-1972 ).
-We-also hypothesized thaI individualiSm woula be -correlated with the degree of variability associated with judgments of emotion. This hypothesis was not supported, and is surprising. Moreover, ju!'>t 3!'> many correlations were significant using this dime-nsion.as compared to the other dimensions. These findings suggest that individualism as a culture-level phen~menon may not impact on emotion perGeption in terms of-withhi<ulture nmge. Rather, this
MatSUmoto I CULTURE AND EMOTION IOJ dimension most likely influences the recognition of emotion and attributions of intensity. The nonsignificant correlations indicate that the socialization processes that produce cultural differences in individualism may have the same degree of variation across cultures. at least concerning their effects on the perception of emotion intensity.
There are limitations to this study. For example, the sman sample size. particularly in analyzing the intensity ratings.,makes it difficult to generalize to a wide variety of cultures. But, given the wide range of cultural variation scores, and the fact that significant product moment correlations were also significant when computed separately according to photo Tankscores,-or when using rank-order cOTTelations, we can safely conclude that the coTTelationswe-report are not spurious.
On the other hand, the fact that cultural scores were assigned to cultures, and that the culture scores were generated from another sample of subjects, makes the obtained correlations quite impressive. In assigning dimension scores to the cultures, there is tbe assumption that they are accurate representations of the cultural dimensions in the subjects giving the judgments of the expressions. The fact that culture scores were assigned, and significant correlations were obtained using these assigned scores, suggests the strength of this approach. Procedures that entail the collection of scores of cultural variability from the same individuals .givi~g the judgments of facial expressions may produce even stronger effects, as within-and between-culture differences in the judgments ca:nbe related to differences in the dimensions of cultural variabmty in the same individuals.
Despil~_.th..e_se limitations, the findings from .the present study----give ample evidence that the.use of stable dimensions of cultural variability offers an operationaIization of culture that can be meaningfully applied to both theory and data. Future research on the perception of facial expression using individual measures of cultural variability wiH substantially advance our knowledge of the wayscuJtur-esinfluence emotion. f t-------t
